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CAPITAL PRETRIAL MOTIONS: ADDED DIMENSIONS
By: Thomas W. Plimpton
Kerry D. Lee
Capital cases require some pretrial motions not heard of in
other trials. Also, some pretrial motions found in non-capital cases
take on added importance in capital cases (e.g., motion for change of
venue). Virtually every aspect of a capital trial implicates federal law.
Pretrial motions practice is not the only way to raise federal issues in
a capital trial. However, it is a systematic way whereby defense
counsel may plan with deliberate care to preserve all possibly
meritorious issues on the record should appeal prove necessary. This
article deals with pretrial motions unique to capital cases as well as
motions more generally used but of heightened importance in a
capital case. The article also discusses the timing for filing pretrial
motions and the reasons for filing them.
Pretrial motions in capital cases may serve at least three
distinct functions. First, and most important, granting of the motion
could make the trial fairer. Motions for additional time or resources,
such as requests for experts or investigators, address the tremendous
imbalance in resources between the Commonwealth and appointed
counsel and enhance the opportunity for effective representation of
capital defendants. Second, a meritorious pretrial motion may
preserve an issue on the record for appeal. (Conversely, claims may
be lost if not asserted pretrial). Third, pretrial motions may create
currency for negotiation of a non-capital disposition.
Pretrial motions should be founded upon a good faith basis for
filing. A good faith basis may exist, however, even when it appears
unlikely that the motion will be granted. On the other hand, frivolous
motions or voluminous motions made for effect rather than for the
purpose of obtaining a fairer trial undermine the credibility of
counsel. Credibility is not undermined when voluminous motions
reflect legitimate issues, viably supported and argued.
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Benefits may accrue to the defendant even from denial of
pretrial motions. The pretrial motion becomes part of the official
record. Issues addressed by pretrial motions may be raised by the
defendant on appeal. If the trial judge has erroneously denied the
motion, the conviction or sentence may be overturned. For example,
in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S. Ct 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53
(1985), a capital case, defense counsel filed a pretrial motion
requesting a psychiatric expert. At that time such assistance had not
been held to be required under the Constitution. Ultimately, the
United States Supreme Court found that the trial judge had erred in
denying the motion and ordered a new trial. 470 U.S. at 74. Ake was
convicted again, but this time sentenced to life in prison and not
death.
Other benefits may flow from filing as many legitimate pretrial
motions as possible. Each motion requires a ruling. Only one non-
harmless error in denying a motion is required for post-conviction
relief. Therefore judges may focus their attention more carefully upon
the merits of a pretrial motion (even an unusual motion) when the
motion is well argued and supported, and stands as one of a sequence
of well argued pretrial motions. It is important in this regard that
pretrial motions, wherever possible, not be paper filings. Whenever
appropriate, a hearing should be requested at which evidence is
presented.
Preservation of issues through pretrial motions may yield
benefits to the defendant even if the legal argument in support of the
motion runs counter to prevailing law. Absent preservation of the
issue on the record, the issue may not be raised later in the event of a
favorable shift in the law. So long as issues are raised and preserved,
defendants are entitled to the benefit of later constitutional pro-
nouncements (even those like Ake placing new obligations on the
state) in cases decided before the defendant reaches the collateral
proceeding stage. Even at habeas, defendants are entitled to favorable
law which is found to be only an extension of principles announced
in earlier cases. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S..__ 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103
L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989). See e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. ___, 109
S.Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989) (state scheme must provide
means for sentencer to give effect to mental retardation evidence, and
this is but an extension of principles in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
98 S. Ct. 2954,57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978) and Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982)).
Pretrial motions should federalize each issue. To federalize an
issue in a capital case means to ground the claim for relief in rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution in addition to all
applicable state law grounds. Unless federalized and successfully
preserved, an issue may not survive the leap from the state courts to
the federal judiciary upon appeal.
Even if the pretrial motion is ultimately denied at trial and
relief does not come on appeal, the motion may have facilitated
negotiation. Pretrial motions and other trial events, may provide
currency for negotiation sufficient to persuade the prosecution to
negotiate a non-capital disposition.
The Commonwealth must balance several different considera-
tions while prosecuting its case, not least of which is uncertainty.
Obtaining a conviction of capital murder is never certain. Even if the
defendant is convicted it is not certain that a death sentence will
result. Further, a death sentence it may not survive appeal.
The lack of finality associated with appeal raises other
considerations for the prosecution. In any event, it takes years to
finalize a capital case through the appeals process. This lack of
finality is very hard on the victimi's family. Also the lack of finality
results in loss of any possible deterrent value of the conviction and
sentence.
The prosecution must also consider the expense of a capital
case. The necessary investment of court time both at trial and on
appeal speak for negotiating a non-capital disposition. Pretrial
motions for the extra resources needed in capital cases heighten the
concern regarding wise allocation of resources.
Trial of a capital case may destroy harmony by disrupting the
community. Whether or not the community at large is disrupted,
trying a capital case certainly disrupts harmony in the legal commu-
nity. Such a trial must become a hard-ball adversarial proceeding
with everyone on the record at which indulging the usual courtesies
and cooperation cannot be risked.
Finally, pretrial motions may produce evidentiary hearings that
demonstrate mitigating factors. The Commonwealth possesses
complete discretion as to whether to pursue the death penalty.
Responsible prosecutors, who have seen a variety of homicide cases,
may be more heavily influenced by mitigating evidence than would a
jury. If a case is seen as not substantially more aggravated than other
homicides in light of all circumstances, including mitigation
evidence, it may not merit a capital prosecution.
Each of these types of currency for negotiation may be
generated in part by pretrial motions practice. The more currency for
negotiation defense counsel accumulates the more likely the
prosecution will decide for the certainty, finality, economy, and
harmony of a non-capital disposition.
Motions must be timely filed in order to be considered by the
court. Some motions must be made pretrial. Other motions may be
made pretrial. Virginia Supreme Court Rule 3A:9 sets forth the
timing for filing motions. Section (b)(1) describes the motions which
must be made pretrial. Section (b)(2) describes the motions which
may be made pretrial. If a motion must be filed pretrial, section (c)
establishes the time frame for filing.
Motions required to be filed pretrial must be filed prior to
entering a plea and at least seven days before the trial date. Failure to
meet these requirements constitutes a waiver of the right to file the
motion. Motions which must be filed pretrial include motions
encompassing defenses and objections based upon defects in the
institution of the prosecution or in the written charge upon which the
accused is to be tried. The only exceptions are objections to jurisdic-
tion or a defense that the written charge fails to charge an offense.
These motions shall be noticed by the court at any point during the
proceeding.
Examples of motions common to capital trials which must be
made pretrial include a motion for a bill of particulars and a motion
to dismiss based upon the unconstitutionality of the statute under
which the accused is charged. For good cause shown, the court, at its
discretion, may allow untimely filing of these or any other motions.
Motions which may be filed pretrial include any defense or
objection which is capable of determination without the trial of the
general issue of guilt or innocence. Even though the rule does not
require filing certain motions pretrial, as a practical matter they
should be filed pretrial. Obviously, motions for discovery and for
additional resources should be filed pretrial in almost every instance
so that there is time for incorporating the benefits of the granted
motion into the defense strategy.
Strategic considerations encompass more than mere timing of
pretrial motions. Exhaustive motions force the prosecution to use
some of its resources on legal research, thereby diverting it from its
planned course of preparation to one dealing with important constitu-
tional and procedural issues. Exhaustive pretrial motions may further
force the prosecution to reveal more and more of its theory of the
case and both favorable and unfavorable evidence which can be used
in negotiations, cross-examination, impeachment, etc. Another
important strategy consideration of pretrial motions is that they
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provide time to explore all defense possibilities. Since capital cases
require the attorney to perform numerous and unfamiliar duties in
order to render effective assistance, it is important to obtain as much
extra time as possible.
Strategic considerations require that pretrial motions be filed
even when it is unlikely that the motion will be granted. This is true
for four reasons. First, an unsuccessful motion can be the reason
another motion succeeds. A motion for a change of venue that is
denied may very well convince the trial judge that individual
sequestered voir dire is necessary, or that more peremptory chal-
lenges are needed. Second, it is not possible to look into the future to
know the course of the law. What is clearly unavailable to defendant
in the mind of a trial judge today may become a routine right in the
future. Third, unless the attorney raises and preserves all claims on
the appropriate state and federal grounds, these rights will be
considered to have been waived by the client. Fourth, claims which
are lost raise the possibility that the attorney will later face an
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim. It is necessary, therefore, for
attorneys be aware of issues percolating through the lower courts in
other jurisdictions which, several years down the road could turn into
helpful precedent. If applicable, motions should be filed raising these
issues so that any future favorable decision will be available to the
client. However, as discussed above, even if issues are preserved, not
all future decisions will be able to aid the defendant.
The pretrial stage is one of the most important phases of a
death penalty case. Used effectively, pretrial motions may be the
most significant factor in securing a non-capital disposition. As has
been noted, matters unique to the capital aspect of a case mean that a
proper defense will and should result in a significant expenditure of
time, money and human resources by the Commonwealth. This very
drain on resources can be a factor in securing a non-capital disposi-
tion. It should be remembered that the responsibility for these extra
requirements rests with the Commonwealth, which can exercise its
discretion to eliminate the capital aspect at any time. Pretrial motions
which are heard and argued in half-a-day or less only aid the
prosecution.
What follows is a brief discussion of some pretrial motions
that are particularly important in capital cases. Obviously, the list is
illustrative and not exhaustive. The motions discussed are included in
part to show that both the need for the relief sought and the authority
for granting them may differ from that present in non-capital cases.
MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS
In Virginia, courts have generally ruled that a criminal
defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars "to gain information on
the nature of the charge against him so as to enable him to prepare for
trial, avoid or minimize the danger of surprise at time of trial, and
enable him to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another
prosecution for the same offense." United States v. Dalin, 410 F.2d
363, 364 (4th Cir. 1969). See also Pine v. Commonwealth, 121 Va.
812, 93 S.E. 652 (1917) (Authority to direct abill of particulars is
"inherent in the trial court in the orderly administration of justice.")
In Virginia a motion for a bill of particulars must be filed
pretrial. Therefore it must be filed prior to entering a plea and at least
seven days before trial. The motion should specifically request
clarification of what makes this alleged offense capital murder under
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31. The motion should seek to learn the
prosecution's theory of the case relating to each element of every
charge brought against the defendant.
In theory a bill of particulars is not a discovery device. In
reality, it is the defense's first opportunity to discover the nature of
the evidence against the accused and to learn the prosecution's theory
of the case. The request for a bill of particulars may seek more than a
mere clarification of the indictment or charge. The motion for a bill
of particulars may request identification of all evidence supporting
the prosecution's theory of the case. If the trial judge grants a motion
for a bill of particulars which requests identification of evidence, the
state is obliged to reveal all requested information.
With Virginia's system of bifurcated capital trials, a bill of
particulars may inquire into the prosecution's specific theory of the
case-in-chief and also inquire into the prosecution's theory regarding
aggravating factors necessary to imposition of the death penalty. The
bill of particulars should specifically request disclosure of the
aggravating factor(s) the Commonwealth will assert and the evidence
supporting that assertion. Since the aggravating factors may involve a
theory of future dangerousness or vileness it is important to the
defense to know how to prepare the case in mitigation should the
defendant be convicted. If the aggravating factor is vileness, the
complicating factor of three definitions of vileness (torture, depravity
of mind, or aggravated battery) make the information from a bill of
particulars especially valuable in preparing for the sentencing phase
of the trial.
Clarification of what the prosecution intends to prove against
the defendant, revealed in reply to the motion for a bill of particulars,
may result in further pretrial motions by the defense. For example, if
the prosecution intends to seek the death penalty, but all the evidence
shows that the defendant was not the triggerman in a capital murder
case, the defense may make a motion to dismiss the capital indict-
ment or to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty under Va.
Code Arm. § 18.2-18. Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370,345
S.E.2d 267 (1986). Granting of such motions early not only removes
the capital threat to the defendant, but also conserves the fiscal
resources of the Commonwealth.
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
In a capital trial, time is the one resource absolutely necessary
for the effective assistance of counsel. The complexity of defending a
capital murder case and the extensive investigation made necessary
by the prospect of a penalty trial require substantial periods of time
beyond that necessary to prepare a non-capital defense. Thus, a
motion for continuance -hay be the most important pretrial motion
filed by defense counsel.
The United States Supreme Court has observed that heightened
requirements of due process apply in capital cases. Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S. Ct. 2978,49 L. Ed. 2d 944
(1976). Part of due process applicable to states is effective assistance
of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792,9 L.
Ed. 2d 799 (1963); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Denial of sufficient time to
prepare a defense with deliberate care thus implicates federal rights.
The continuance motion should be made on these federal grounds,
supported by proffers of what will be done if the continuance is
granted. Denial of a motion for continuance for this purpose may
violate the sixth amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 91 L.
Ed. 2d 434 (1985).
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE
The right to a fair trial and impartial jury is both constitution-
ally and statutorily guaranteed. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct.
2765, 106 L. Ed. 2d 713 (1989). A presumption exists however, that
a defendant can receive a fair trial in the city or county in which the
offense occurred. U.S. Const. amend. VI. If there is a "reasonable
likelihood" that the defendant would receive a prejudicial jury, the
defendant has a constitutional right to a change of venue. Stockton v.
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Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 137, 314 S.E.2d 371,379 (1984), cert.
denied 469 U.S. 873, 105 S. Ct. 224, 83 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1988).
Virginia courts grant a change of venue if there is widespread
prejudice reasonably certain to prevent a fair trial. Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363, 86 S, CL 1507, 1522, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600,
612 (1976). The trial court is empowered with broad discretion to
decide a motion for a change of venue, and reversal occurs only if
there is a finding of an abuse of discretion. Coppola v. Common-
wealth, 220 Va. 243, 247, 257 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1983), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1103, 100 S. Ct. 1069, 62 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1980). Since
change of venue issues involve the right to an impartial jury, although
not ajury completely ignorant of the case, alternate means of insuring
that right are often employed by the court. It is not uncommon for the
court to defer ruling on the change of venue motion until the
commencement of trial. Then, the court has the option to grant
individual sequestered voir dire, or grant the change of venue motion
if voir dire reveals sufficient prejudice.
Although the evidence presented on this motion will vary
according to the particular case, several types of publicity influence
the determination that the motion would be granted. One ground for a
change of venue is the publication of a confession. Id. References to
arrests or prior convictions, reports of prior conviction for the same
crime, and reports of attempted escape while awaiting trial have also
been found prejudicial. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726, 83 S.
Ct. 1417, 1419, 10 L. Ed. 2d 663, 665 (1963). Moreover, in Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961), an
atmosphere of bitter prejudice was created by pretrial publicity
characterizing the defendant as remorseless and without conscience.
While motions supported solely by newspaper clippings rarely
succeed, counsel may present testimony of witnesses, television
tapes, or informal opinion polls (either conducted by counsel or
through local newspapers).
MOTION FOR INDIVIDUAL SEQUESTERED VOIR DIRE
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-357 provides for jury selection by
collective voir dire in panels. The advantages of individual and
sequestered voir dire compared to Virginia's system are obvious,
particularly in capital cases where juror attitudes about life or death
must be probed with potentially sensitive questions. Individual
sequestered voir dire encourages candor, which, even on points
seemingly unrelated to knowledge of the case or attitudes toward race
and death, greatly enhances the ability of defense counsel to make
informed decisions about prospective jurors.
Psychological studies have been conducted examining the
impact on jurors of particular questions and particular questioners.
The findings suggest that the jurors questioned in a group quickly
learn which responses will disqualify them versus those responses
that will allow them to serve. Bush, The Case For Expansive Voir
Dire, 2 Law and Psychology Review 9 (jurors subjected to group voir
dire learned what response would disqualify them and withheld that
information). Similarly, jurors learn which responses will disqualify
them and use that information to be disqualified. Gray v. Mississippi,
481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1987). Based on
these concerns and the serious nature of the proceedings against the
defendant, the procedure of individual sequestered voir dire is
specifically appropriate for three reasons. First, the defendant has a
right to a fair and impartial jury. Veniremen may be excluded if it is
shown that they are unable to follow the trial judge's directions and
the law regarding imposition of the death sentence. The case of
Wainwright v. Witt requires that the voir dire method used ensure that
no venireman's excluded unless his attitude toward the death penalty
would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S. Ct 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841
(1985). Individual sequestered voir dire could eliminate the contami-
nation of the venire demonstrated by the psychological studies and
provide for efficient and effective compliance with the requirements
of Witt. Second, the Supreme Court has held that death is qualita-
tively different from any other penalty and that difference calls for a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determina-
tion that death is the appropriate punishment in a particular case. See
generally, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
The additional procedural safeguards applicable at the trial level in
capital cases, see Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. CL 2765, 106 L Ed.
2d 713 (1989) (additional due process only required at trial and direct
appeal), are particularly important to jury selection procedures
because the jury deternines both guilt or innocence and sentence.
Thus Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and an
impartial jury mean more must be done by the counsel for both
parties to meet this need for heightened reliability. Defense counsel is
therefor required to make informed decisions about potential jury
members. Collective voir dire of jurors in panels will preclude the
candor and honesty on the part of the jurors which is necessary for
counsel to make these informed decisions.
The heightened reliability standard applicable in capital cases
is not the only authority for granting this or any pretrial motion. The
trial court has inherent authority over the conduct of a trial. Cunning-
ham v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 358, 344 S.E.2d 389 (1986);
Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 283 S.E.2d 905 (1981).
Beyond the federal argument of the need for additional procedural
safeguards, defense counsel should call on the inherent authority of
the trial court to ensure a fair trial.
Third, individual sequestered voir dire is invaluable to defense
counsel's ability to open a conversation between counsel and each
potential juror. The give and take of a conversation will reveal more
about the juror than answers to a prepared list of questions. There is a
need to question each juror as thoroughly as possible in order to be
able to make the most intelligent choices about each and every jury
member and secure the most qualified jury.
MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Section 19.2-262 of the Code of Virginia allows the defendant
only four peremptory challenges. The motion for additional peremp-
tory challenges takes on particular importance since so few are
specifically authorized by Virginia law. Along with the motions for
change of venue and individual sequestered voir dire, additional
peremptory challenges provide an opportunity for counsel to prevent
bias from affecting the outcome of the trial. The legal rationale for a
motion for additional peremptory challenges is similar to that
underlying other motions in a capital case. See supra, Woodson and
Giarratano. Due to the unique nature of a capital trial, and the
impossibility of revealing all prejudgment and predisposition of
potential jurors during voir dire, defendant should be entitled to
additional peremptory challenges not only under the inherent
authority of state trial courts but also to ensure rights guaranteed by
the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States.
Furthermore, because the state seeks the death penalty, there is
greater need for additional peremptory challenges to screen out any
bias and prejudice in the selection of the defendant's jury to ensure
that the sentencing decision is not the result of arbitrary factors or
prejudice. See Woodson, supra; Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
357-358 (1977).
Additionally, in the federal courts and in twenty states,
including Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Tennessee, defendants are entitled to more than
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four petemptory challenges and are entitled to a greater number of
peremptory challenges than is the state, even in non-capital cases. J.
Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures, 282-3 (Ballinger 1977). Thus,
a request that the court grant additional challenges is not a novel idea,
but is merely a request to employ a practice already recognized in
many courts as necessary to protect the right of a defendant to a fair
trial, even in non-capital cases.
MOTION TO PROHIBIT THE IMPOSITION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The motion to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty, and
its supporting memorandum of authority drafted by Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse, includes five sections. These five sections point
out flaws in the application of Virginia's death penalty statute and
together make the argument that Virginia's statute is unconstitutional.
The first section argues that both the "future dangerousness"
and "vileness" aggravating factors fail to guide the jury's discretion
as required by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33
L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S. Ct.
1759, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1980); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S.
356, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1988). The vileness
predicate must be sufficiently narrowed to guide the jury's discretion
in order to be constitutional. Virginia's vileness predicate on its face
and as applied fails to guide the jury's discretion to prevent the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.
Section two argues that the imposition of the death penalty
based on the aggravating factor of "future dangerousness" is
unconstitutional because the use of prior conviction evidence violates
the defendant's 5th and 14th Amendments right not to be placed
twice in jeopardy. It urges that, by allowing the jury to use the
evidence of prior convictions to impose the sentencing of death, the
defendant has been given multiple punishments for the same offense.
The third section states that the execution of a sentence of
death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of
the Eighth Amendment. This argument is based on the contention
that society's standards of decency have evolved to the point that
execution can no longer be tolerated. Thirteen states have declined to
reinstate the death penalty. Other states have death penalty statutes
but no death sentences. Still other states have death sentences but no
executions. It is argued that these facts demonstrate a national
consensus that executions are not necessary or acceptable to serve the
retributive interests of society.
Section four first argues that Virginia courts practice of failing
adequately to instruct on mitigation, and the use of incomplete and
misleading instructions and forms violates constitutional commands
in along line of cases starting with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978), by creating an impermissible risk that a death sentence will
be imposed despite mitigating factors justifying a sentence less than
death.
Section five argues that Virginia's lack of meaningful
appellate review of death sentence cases violates Fourteenth
Amendment due process. Virginia provides for review of death
sentences by the Virginia Supreme Court. Va. Code Ann § 17-110.1
(1988). The Virginia statutory scheme does not, however, provide for
meaningful appellate review.
The Virginia statutory scheme does not require the trial judge
or jury to specify the findings that justified an imposition of a death
sentence. Without documentation of the reasons supporting a
sentence of death, the Virginia Supreme Court cannot conduct a
meaningful appellate review of the imposition of the death penalty.
Further, there is no review of life sentences where there is no appeal.
A statutory scheme that fails to provide for meaningful appellate
review violates a defendant's Eighth Amendment right against cruel
and unusual punishment. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S. Ct.
871, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1984).
This motion should be filed pretrial, as it raises systemic
constitutional issues about the application of Virginia's death penalty.
However, whether a questionable procedure will actually be
employed in a given trial will not be known until the appropriate time
in the trial. For example, one cannot be sure that the objectional
standard jury instruction will be given or the improper evidence
offered to support future dangerousness until witnesses are proffered
and instructions given at the penalty phase. Consequently, the motion
should be renewed at the time the violation allegedly occurs. See
Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 377 S.E.2d 595 (1989)
(defense counsel determined to have waived objection to venue by
failing to renew motion).
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In Virginia, the capital statutory scheme purports to narrow the
class of death eligible persons by enumerating certain circumstances
under which a homicide becomes capital murder. In order to sustain a
capital conviction under § 18.2-3 1, the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt (1) a willful, deliberate, premeditated
killing in addition to one of the four enumerated first degree felonies
(abduction with intent to extort money or pecuniary benefit, abduc-
tion with intent to defile, robbery and rape), or (2) a willful, deliber-
ate, premeditated murder in one of four other contexts (killing for
hire, killing by a prisoner, killing of a law enforcement officer, killing
of more than one person as part of the same transaction). Va. Code
Ann. § 18.31 (1-8).
Unlike the statutory schemes in other states, the Virginia
statute does not require the Commonwealth to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt one particularly aggravated murder. The North
Carolina capital murder statute, for example, requires the prosecution
prove only first degree murder to sustain a capital conviction. By
contrast, in prosecutions under one of the four felony sections, the
Virginia statute requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt two felonious activities, each with independent
elements. Each of the felonies that can "elevate" premeditated first
degree murder to capital murder is a separate crime that may be
prosecuted where there is no homicide. Consequently, Virginia court;
have the opportunity to construe the elements of robbery, rape, and
abduction in both capital and non-capital contexts. This article
analyzes the variations in construction of the reach of these enumer-
ated offenses. The capital statute now includes as predicate offenses
the felonies of attempted robbery and attempted rape. At present, no
capital convictions have been based on attempt. Analysis of possible
capital versus non-capital construction of attempt is beyond the scope
of this article.
(a) Robbery as a predicate offense:
The offense of robbery has a definition which is more broadly
construed by the Supreme Court of Virginia when robbery is used as
